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 During the past two decades, the political landscape of Europe has undergone dramatic change. 
The powerful matrix of global capitalism has deeply affected European nation forms, social ideologies, 
and political systems, as suggested by German unification, the collapse of the Soviet regime, the war 
in the former Yu goslavia, and the subsequent formation of the European Union, including the Euro­
peanization of post­socialist states. In this context, the historical fixity of borders, bodies, and spaces has 
been unmoored.1 The end of the Cold War fur nished new possibilities for envisioning society, promot­
ing major transformations in the fabric of Europe’s national communities.2 In addition, the emergent 
entanglements of state and corporate interests not only changed the political contours of Europe but also 
altered the social conditions under which imaginaries of belonging are brought to public visibility.
 How is citizenship configured in this globally transformed political space? In the European 
Union, the realities of ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism have unraveled the idea of citizens as ho­
mogenous or undifferentiated ag gregates. Yet as Europe strives to achieve political and economic unity, 
we see a concurrent push toward inequality, cultural exclusion, and linguistic marginaliza tion.3 The leg­
acies of colonialism and fas cist nationalism not only continue to imprint the privilege of whiteness onto 
the new map of Europe, but they also sustain the fortification of Europe as a hegemonic “white” space.4 
From this perspective, the focus on citizenship in Europe by detour to the master narratives of Cold War 
national history, as I argue here, requires a critical reas sessment. In efforts to both accommodate and re­
pel the tension­fraught effects of a globalizing Europe, local reassertions of nationality have given rise to 
new measures of exclusion, framed by anti­immigrant sentiments, the closure of bor ders, and ethnoracial 
nationalism. 
 In this essay, I examine how such assertions of nationhood have gained promi nence in European 
Union countries. My analysis of the shifting parameters of national belonging proceeds by a focus on 
one case example: post­unification Germany. While specific concerns about border security or legacies 
of national history might not be applicable to all European states, we see a common push to ward national 
distinction and emergent forms of lingual citizenship. Since the 1990s, the projected frontiers of Europe­
an nations, the lines dividing the native from the foreign, are increasingly mapped through the medium 
of language. In Germany, as in France, Holland, Belgium, and Denmark, or Austria, national identity 
politics have become language politics, a terrain marked by fears of lin guistic estrangement and a public 
preoccupation with pre serving an authentic national interior. The nation is configured as a speech com­
munity of ethnic Ger mans. How did this come to pass? In tracing the political production of linguistic 
disClosure Volume 25
nationalism, my analytic attention is focused on post­uni fication Germany, a “nation form”5 that tends to 
legitimate itself by recourse to corporal metaphors. Linguistic nationalism draws on quasi­mythic notions 
of the German political community as a language­body, a closed linguistic corpus, which is presumed to 
be organic, essential, and pure. Language national ism, which aims to protect the integrity of this ethno­
linguistic entity, is located on an imaginary landscape of in tensely charged concepts: nation, nature, and 
race. 
 Building on these insights, my reflections on language politics in contempo rary Germany rely 
on a montage of data from multiple sources. Informed by earlier studies of ethnoracial machinations in 
Europe and across the globe,6 my project draws on long­term fieldwork in Germany. During a four­year 
residence as a faculty member at the University Tuebingen from 1997 to 2001, I had the oppor tunity 
to become an ob serving participant of the problematic formation of the European Union, the EURO 
zone, and the subsequent implementation of Europe anization initiatives, such as language reform and 
the rearticulation of immigra tion policies. Living and working in Germany provided me with unique 
opportu nities to participate in di verse forms of community; to engage in discussions with students, col­
leagues, and family members; and to conduct informal interviews with neighbors, strangers, immigrant 
workers, journalists, bureaucrats, state offi cials, and school teachers. Between 2002 and 2012, I was able 
to refine my pri mary field data with follow­up research trips that ranged from a few weeks to several 
months each year, and included study­travel to various cities across Europe (Venice, Budapest, Frankfurt, 
Oslo, Bergen, Munich). My insights about German nationalism and im migrants’ everyday experiences 
were further en hanced by my extensive scrutiny of media images, news reports, and political discourse, 
as well as European Union and United Nations documents. Guided by the expansive scholarship on 
racial formations in twenty­first century,7 the presentation of my research findings follows a critical ap­
proach to contemporary forms of national be longing. 
 My essay begins with a brief sketch of the broader context of transborder poli tics in Europe. 
The selected vignettes include Germany’s self­representation to the world, central to which is the trope 
of the nation as a white female icon, whose erotic allure propagates open borders for foreign investors. 
This gendered fantasy of nationhood coexists with European national discourses about the entry of Mus­
lims (most recently, Syrian refugees) into Europe, which is per ceived as a threat to national sovereignty 
and culture. In presenting these contrary approaches to border security, my aim is to offer an overview 
of racializing prac tices in and by European countries prior to analyzing the emergent phenomenon of 
linguistic nationalism in specific EU member­states. In the subsequent sections of this arti cle, my dis­
cussion turns to the German citizenship debates and the push for border fortification via the instrument 
of a national language. Here my evidence derives from a diversity of intersecting political fields: lingual 
citizen ship, language reform, and the formation of German literary societies, which render visible the 
phantasm of language purity and the fear of linguistic differ ence. These are themes that I also investigate 
by a critical reexamination of ethnographic research. My essay interrogates language as a battleground 
that problematizes immigrant presence and national belonging in postunified Germany, a country which 
is also a core nation­state in a multiethnic and plurilingual Europe.
Whiteness as a National Emblem: Branding Distinctions
 What resources are mobilized by European nation­states to reclaim their sover eignty under glo­
balization? In the twenty­first century, the manufacture of Euro pean national distinction has increas­
ingly shifted to the market place, the terrain of advertising, fashion, and media. Culture industries man­
ufacture national dis tinction by means of commodity desire and consumption. When circulated across 
political borders to attract foreign investment and international consumer atten tion, such marketing re­
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lies on familiar motifs: gender, sex, and race. Consider the following example, a worldwide marketing 
campaign sponsored by the German government and launched in 2006.
Snapshot One. In London, New York, and Tokyo, gigantic billboards in subway stations and 
airports promote financial investment opportunities in Germany by featuring supermodel Clau­
dia Schiffer.8 Seductively posed, her pale­white body is stretched horizontally across the visual 
frame: an endless space of whiteness. She is casually positioned, reclined on her side. The silky 
fabric of the German national flag, which is ten derly draped across her torso, accentuates her 
body’s nudity, revealing the immaculate smoothness of her legs and arms. She is facing the cam­
era, her head slightly propped up, framed by her arms and cascading blond hair. Posed against 
a white screen, she extends an invita tion as part of the global marketing campaign: “Invest in 
Germany—Land of Ideas.” This advocacy of monetary investment in German busi ness ventures 
is further articulated by a series of suggestive slogans: “Discover the beauty of the deal”; “Invest 
in Germany, boys”; “Inter ested in a serious relationship?”; “Come on over to my place”; “Follow 
your instincts.”
 
 In the spaces of transborder capitalism, the German marketing initiative is in fused with erotic 
messages. The campaign toys with the seductive image of the goddess Europa (interweaving myth, his­
tory, ancestry) and the lure of the iconic “white woman” to evoke gendered fantasies of sexual conquest 
and erotic capture. The campaign­designers envision international investors as male, as businessmen, 
whose lurid economic desires can be fulfilled by intimacy with the German nation as a female plaything. 
In this fantasy, transnational financial endeavors are crafted as intimate erotic encounters. Capital in­
vestment in Germany is presented as a sexual adventure. The white female body/nation is offered up as 
a consuma ble commodity in global capitalist space. Although the white female figure inhab its this imag­
inary terrain, she is branded as a political subject: the German flag envelops her body; she is marked as a 
national icon. Like a ventriloquist’s doll, she gives corporal form and voice to the nation’s desires.
 But the work of neoliberal economies, with their seductive promise of unlim ited possibilities, is 
simultaneously defended as a state­protected privilege, a con cession of citizenship reserved for Europe­
an nationals. The political spaces of capitalism are closely guarded. Lawmakers, politicians, and media 
industries call upon imaginaries of language, gender, and race to authorize or deny participation in the 
dreamworlds of prosperity. The for mation of the European security state after 9/11 2001 has intensified 
this process by giving rise to new border regimes. Founded on a cohesive network of political, military, 
and corporate interests, the neoliberal security­state has fundamentally altered the possibilities for nego­
tiating matters of belonging in Europe. My research across Europe’s multinational spaces reveals that the 
collusion of global economic restructuring and entrenched local commitments propagates old as well as 
new disparities.
Modalities of Difference: Gender, Race, and Immigration
 As a reformist entity, the European Union has positioned itself as a legal order against the un­
precedented fluidity and instability of global power relations: the judicial system, according to Clare 
McGlynn, has become the “Union’s genetic code.”9 Although founded on a political order sensitive to 
difference and social equality, the quest for unity and uniformity tends to erode acceptance of otherness. 
In other words, Europe’s preoccupation with judi cial matters, which seeks to neutralize legal pluralism 
and minimize the incoher ence of rights in political practice, produces unforeseen results. Following Mc­
Glynn: “There is a ten dency for the presence of rights to somehow construct the ideal rights­bearing 
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citizen. This assertion of ‘ideal citizen’ models, with its consequent marginaliza tion and exclusion of the 
non­ideal, carries a particular resonance for feminists” and civil rights advocates.10 
 European family policy reforms provide an instructive example: by a focus on protecting wom­
en’s reproductive capacity, the figure of the single, childless, or lesbian woman is rendered invisible.11 
While granting generous provision for mater nity leave and maternal health care, such policy measures 
confirm prevail ing gender expectations: men’s non­involvement in do mestic tasks is not chal lenged. In 
the family reform documents, “women are pre sented as a homogeneous category without race, sexual 
orientation, ethnic origin, ability or any other life dimension.”12 Women’s distinguishing feature is the 
ability to produce children. Europe’s legal intervention in the family aims to protect female procreativity 
as a matter of equal opportunity, thereby reifying women’s traditional roles as mothers and caregivers. 
Although focused on enabling women’s participation in the marketplace without infringing on maternal 
responsibilities, Europe’s legal rights discourse does not prioritize gender equality. The reforms and pro­
visions speak to political concerns about a demographic crisis, a shrinking European population, which 
is attributed to decreasing fertility rates among white women.13
 In what manner are national hegemonies of being and belonging transformed when subjected to 
the regulatory mechanisms of the European Union? The for mation of a united Europe requires norma­
tive standards for implementing binding policies: the rights of equality or prohibitions of discrimination 
need to be en forceable across different nation states. Governed by efforts to avert a legitimation crisis, 
European unification proceeds by a turn to the global legal order: the su pranational polity is stabilized 
by drawing on the repertoire of human rights laws and the “universally valid” normative underpinnings 
of legislation. Europe’s in terface with global legislative standards facilitates political integration. But at 
the same time, as Jo Shaw cautions, “dominant ideologies about women, motherhood, family life, and the 
sexual division of labor” become Euro pean legal doctrine without critical attention to the diversity of 
women’s experi ence.14
 In contemporary Europe, gender politics are reconfigured by a global imagi nary. But in this pro­
cess, ethnonational and local machinations of race, sex, and nation remain uncontested.15 The turn to 
global human rights is a le gitimating practice: it advocates a pseudo­rational universalism that negates 
awareness of the existing modalities of gender and ethnoracial inequalities. In this manner, the religious 
practices and social worlds of Muslim women as immi grants or refugees have gained attention as critical 
transborder matters and nation al security issues rather than as formative fields of civil rights, democra­
cy, and citizenship. Despite the interface with global human rights norms, Europe’s im aginaries of na­
tional belonging remain exclusionary and ethnocentric. Neverthe less, it is noteworthy that immigration 
policies and cultural attitudes to ethnic di versity are not yet uniformly synchronized among European 
Union member states, as suggested by the following example:
Snapshot Two. In Bulgaria, a European Union state since 2007, the trope of the Muslim wom-
an has promoted intense debates about the pub lic frontiers of gendered subjectivities. As in 
France, where Islamophobia is implicated in the controversial ban on the Muslim headscarf in 
public schools, Bulgaria has considered “legal regulations on the wearing of religious symbols” 
by women.16 Similar controver sies about the hijab have emerged in Holland, Belgium, Italy, and 
Ger many, where the admissibility of ‘conspicuous’ religious clothing in public schools and sec­
ular institutional spaces has come under consider ation by lawmakers. In Bulgaria, however, as 
Kristen Ghodsee observed, when several Muslim school girls filed complaints with the national 
Commission of Protection Against Discrimination, the court’s ruling merely affirmed the local 
headmaster’s authority to enforce existing school uniform codes. In those cases, where such dress 
codes were already in place, Muslim schoolgirls were mandated to continue their public educa­
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tion “bareheaded,” a deci sion judged to “promote gender equality.”17 In other instances, where 
no such dress codes were evident, the commission ruled that the schoolgirls were free to wear 
whatever clothing they de sired. By empowering local institutions, postsocialist Bulgaria has man­
aged to safeguard the public deportment of Muslim female bodies from state intervention.
 Bulgaria’s judicial approach is remarkably different from the course of action taken in other west­
ern European countries, where the public demeanor of Muslim women is socially monitored and legally 
re stricted. In Bulgaria, Muslims are political subjects with long­standing claims to membership in the 
national community: “Unlike in Germany, Britain or France, Bulgaria’s Muslims have been [citizens 
for centuries] as a legacy of the Ottoman Empire.”18 The religious attire of Muslim girls is thereby less 
entangled in debates about immi gration, national security, and the resistance of ethnic minorities to inte­
grate or westernize. While not completely disengaged from Europe’s ne ocolonial or imperialist legacies, 
including ethno­religious intolerance, the headscarf debates in Bulgaria are differently encoded by eco­
nomic rationality: secondary education in Bulgaria depends on tuition­paying students and the continu­
ous enrollment of Muslim girls in public schools is judged a critical issue.19 By contrast, in France, a Mus­
lim woman’s hijab and facial covering is deemed an “assimilation de fect,” a rejection of French values of 
equality,20 which results in the denial or negation of citizenship status.21
  Why has the Islamic female body been so vigorously pushed into the center of political atten­
tion? Spectacularized by media, commodified by political dis course, and scrutinized in public debates, 
the figure of the Muslim woman has emerged as a global symbol of modernity’s female double. In Eu­
rope’s orientalist imagination, the public sight of veiled female bodies invokes fantasies about po lygamy, 
arranged marriages, honor killings, domestic con finement, and other imagined affronts to European sen­
sibilities regarding gen der roles and sexual mores.22 The practice of female veiling is inter preted as an 
outward sign of the patriarchal reach of Islam, which prevents Mus lim women from shedding their cul­
tural allegiance and inhibits their ability to be come assimilated European subjects. This Europeanizing 
logic negates the mean ings attached to the veil by Muslim women themselves, who wear it as a dense 
signifier of distinction, social standing, devotion, and protection. The use of the veil or some other form 
of head­body­covering has historically been regarded as a liberating device. As a means of “portable se­
clusion,” as Lila Abu­Lughod explained, it grants women the freedom of mobility.23 Since a conventional 
‘cover’ ena bles Muslim women to freely move about in public, it makes little sense that they should desire 
to denounce or abandon this article of clothing. But in Europe, in the volatile terrain of national border 
security and anti­immigration sentiments, this practice has been encoded with different meanings. In­
terpreted in political terms as a barrier to cultural integration and as an embodied sign of op pression, the 
practice of female concealment has become a battleground—a criminalized site—for disciplinary inter­
vention.
   
Negating Europeanness: The Muslim­Arab­Other 
 Seen through the affective resonance of a global security lockdown, Europe’s Muslim women are 
linked to an intrusive, negative ‘immigrant’ presence that needs to be diminished or controlled. Under 
such conditions, marked by a politics of fear and fluctuating demands for border fortification, divergent 
images of dan gerous alterities are assembled to create a unitary figure: the Muslim–Arab–Other. This 
iconic template presents a montage of diverse tropes: the immigrant, the ter rorist, the refugee, and the 
enemy-outsider. Criminalized as icons of global in sta bility, disorder, and terror, Muslims are stripped of 
their right to belong. In the European Union, as suggested by the Bulgarian case, this imaginative turn 
against Muslim minorities has however not yet garnered uniform support. Global anxieties are variously 
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galvanized in different countries. In Germany, the figure of the Is lamic Other is given life by anti­Turkish 
sentiments, a racial formation ener gized by memories of postwar economic reconstruction, ‘guest’ work­
er recruit ment programs, and the desired impermanence of a mobile ethnic labor force. Anti­Islamic 
politics in France are nourished by resentments against Muslim im mi grants from North Africa, whose 
precarious status as a racial minority in the cen ter of Europe is an effect of the aftermath of French co­
lonial violence. In the Netherlands, the figure of the Muslim is populated by Indonesian immigrants, 
whose citizenship rights are entangled with their status as descendants of slave laborers in Dutch plan­
tation colonies. In each of these cases, the ethnographic life of Muslim communities has been shaped by 
political histories, societal memories, and demographic realities. But such local complexities are globally 
unremem bered, replaced by a singular, non­temporal, spatially mobile template: the Mus lim Other. The 
negated icon can thereby subsume salient ethnicities, “draw ing to gether West Indians, Africans, South 
Asians into a blackening singularity as uninvited immigrant presence.”24 Reified by global ideolo gies, the 
construct of the Islamic Other furnishes a distorted lens for assessing difference and alterity.
 Embedded in political fantasies about national security, terrorism, and border protection, as 
Achille Mbembe observed, Europeanness “is imagined as an iden tity against the Other.”25 Tangible al­
terities or figures of difference (the veiled Muslim woman, the Arab terrorist, the black immigrant) oc­
cupy a strategic place in the determination of Europeanness and the articulation of the corre sponding 
fields of whiteness. These “largely unspoken racial connotations” of na tional belonging in Europe, as 
Stuart Hall suggests, are encoded by a cul tural logic of difference that promotes either assimilation or 
exclusion.26 Nation al distinction is manufactured along a narrow register that “accords differing groups 
cultural normativity or deviance.”27 In this volatile terrain, according to Leora Bilsky, the European na­
tion state is “caught between the need to enforce sameness and the fear of absolute difference, with no 
middle ground.”28 
 What modalities of gender or race and what machinations of belonging are deployed by Europe’s 
border regime when assessing residence or citizenship privileges for immigrants? Europeanness is both 
confirmed by appearance and corroborated by performance. Practices of “cultural citizenship” or “social 
pro cesses of whitening,” as Aihwa Ong points out, are monitored by public officials to ascertain wheth­
er a person’s “embodiment of culturally correct citizenship and privilege” has been successful.29 The 
Europeanization of Muslim women not only prohibits the public assertion of ethnic difference but also 
de mands a refashioning of femininity. The forcible unveiling of the Muslim woman’s body in European 
nation states, as in France or Germany, suggests that integration or assimilation requires compliance with 
the practices of capitalist consumer culture. Minority women are rendered ‘white’ or socially acceptable 
when they embody the sexualizing regimes of commoditization.
Shifting Signposts of National Belonging
 At this juncture of globalization, national security, and Europeanization, the cul tural politics of 
belonging to a nation­state in Europe continue to be haunted by the histories of empire and colony. Why 
should this be the case? And what impact does it have on matters of national belonging? While conven­
tionally located in a distinct geographic space, Europe stretches far beyond continental boundaries as a 
result of the formation of the European Union. For concurrent with the inclusion of the various member 
states, the European Union has also incorporated those overseas (remnant colonial) ter ritories that did 
not yet achieved independence from former imperial nations. As a geopolitical entity, the European 
Union thereby extends across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, reaching from Indonesia, Africa, South 
and Central America to Polynesia. Examples include the overseas territories of Portugal, Spain, and 
Denmark (Greenland), the United Kingdom (Cay man, Turks and Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands, British 
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Indian Ocean Territo ries, Bermuda), France (French Polynesia, Martinique, French Guiana, Reunion), 
and the Netherlands (Aruba, Antilles). National subjects who legally reside in these various non­selfgov­
erning parts of the world have become European citizens with the inclusion of the respective Metropoli­
tan states as Union members. What are the implications of this political reality for Europe an plural ism?
 The resident populations of EU overseas territories are European nationals. As European Union 
citizens, they are granted the same privileges and rights as any other European national with regard to 
travel, mobility, work, and residence (across the Schengen zone). In this context, the relative degrees of 
‘whiteness’, as defined by the European national self­imagination, no longer hold up as pub licly validated 
signs of belonging. How then have European nationals “fashioned their distinction”30 in attempts to re­
constitute themselves as global citizens in a multi­ethnic, plurilingual, and postimperial Europe? Markers 
of nationality, I argue, have shifted or expanded from visual to auditory signposts. Language competence 
and speech habits have become political instruments for measuring degrees of assimilation and, in turn, 
suitability for citizenship. In addi tion to appearance or skin color, national languages are used as sites for 
demarcating inclusion and exclusion. Although the European Union population is plurilingual, member 
states and national regions have begun to fiercely defend their sovereign political borders by mandating 
language tests for immigrants. While defined by a unique political history, Germany is a case in fact.
 German unification in the 1990s, that is, the integration of the socialist East with the capitalist 
West, posed a profound challenge: the creation of a single na tion­state and the transformation of legal 
subjects (citizens) into nationals. A uni fied Germany necessitated alternative ways of thinking and feel-
ing the nation. By what means could such a sense of participation in a political community be pro duced? 
According to Etienne Balibar, there are two complementary routes to this: by language and by race.31 
These principles of national belonging, as my research reveals, often operate together, in tandem.
 Although the collapse of the socialist regime in the German Democratic Repub lic and the open­
ing of the Berlin Wall in 1989 were supported internation ally, visions of an expansive German state 
evoked an apprehensive uneasiness. Subsequent anti­refugee riots, anti­immigrant street violence, the 
destruction of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries, the arson murders of Turkish and other immi grant 
families, and the fire­bombings of refugee housing, all “seemed to confirm warnings of the political con­
sequences of German unification.”32 Segments of the German population wanted to “reaffirm ethnocul­
tural homogeneity—as expressed in the slogan ‘Germany for Germans’ and the often repeated mantra 
‘Germany is not an immigration soci ety.’”33 Such sentiments reemerged in 2014, energized by the PEGI-
DA movement (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicization of the Occident) and its slogan: ‘We are 
the Nation’ (Wir sind das Volk). The anxieties of German in tegration, the influx of refugees, and matters 
of European border se curity became trigger points for excavating collective sentiments and memories of 
a national community of ethnic Germans. 
 What were the political responses to this crisis of identity formation? Pre occupied with gate­
keeping, border­guarding, and national armament, German politicians were persistent in their refusal 
to “improve the protection of minorities through detailed anti­discrimination legislation.”34 The political 
answer to the challenges of inclusion took form through government campaigns “against the perceived 
abuse of the liberal right of asylum by so­called economic refugees.”35 Applicants for political refugee­sta­
tus were criminalized.36 Portrayed as para sites, freeloaders, and welfare spongers, ethnic minorities were 
treated as a threat to the German nation.37 The political instrumentalization of anti­foreign sentiments 
by mainstream democratic parties promoted an ethnic fortress mentality: the closing of national borders, 
the reduction of the resident alien population, and the limiting of immigration, in particular that of ref­
ugees.38 A political climate, which encouraged a renaissance of nationalism, ethnicization, and racism, 
effectively impeded the implementation of programs designed to safeguard the legal status of foreign 
nationals and their off spring born in Germany.
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 Nurtured by an understanding of nationhood as a homogenous community based on common 
descent (Abstammungsgemeinschaft), the formation of a united Germany was complicated by an organ­
ic notion of belonging.39 The citizenship law of the Federal Republic of Germany determines national 
member ship through the idiom of descent, as expressed by the Latin term ius sanguinis, “power/law 
of blood.”40 Enacted in 1913—and still in eff ect today—the German citizenship law permits, and even 
encourages, the “na tion’s racial closure.”41 In other words, immigrant children born in Germany do not 
automatically acquire citizenship status. 
Making Nationals: Blood, Space, and Language 
 How can immigrants become German citizens when nationality is rooted in de scent by blood? 
This question became a much­contested issue in 1998, when the leftist coalition government made a con­
certed effort to reform the country’s nat uralization practices. The German Chancellor wanted “to create 
an open society, with flexible borders, to make Germans capable of joining the European Union.”42 Yet 
attempts to reform the citizenship law by eliminating the blood­principle of national belonging proved 
unsuccessful.43 A subsequent proposal, introduced by independent dem ocrats (Free Democratic Party) 
under the heading “dual citizenship for children” seemed more palatable. Dual citizenship or binational­
ity was to create a hyphen ated identity for second­generation immigrants by appending German citizen­
ship to that of national origin. 
 The proposal affirmed the privileged status of native­born Germans. As citi zens by hereditary 
sanguinity, German nationals retained their membership in an ethno­racial community of descent. But 
immigrants, perceived as transient bodies in geopolitical space, merely gained an identity supplement. 
Dual citizenship, ac quired by ius soli (territory/residence), was read as a signifier of otherness, mark ing a 
life course of displacement and uprootedness. The legal reform instituted a two­tiered, caste­like system 
of national belonging: by blood (descent) and by space (residence); one native­German, based on consan­
guinity, which is pre sumed to be natural, authentic, and permanent; the other foreign­German, based 
on territorial affinity, which is deemed artificial, inauthentic, contractual, and im permanent. Given the 
underlying racial paradigm, it seemed only logical that the citizenship status of immigrant children be 
temporary: in its current form, as rati fied in 2002, German nationality can be abrogated upon a child’s 
entry into adulthood.44 The hy phenated citizen is treated as a flexible commodity: German nationality 
is issued on loan; the German passport is granted to immigrants as a revocable entitlement. In a united 
Germany, natural or inherited citizenship enshrines claims of alle giance to a national community of 
blood; by contrast, “flexible citizenship”45 is treated as a counterfeit form.
 The nationality debates had a decisive impact on border matters, resulting in ever more dras­
tic restrictions on access to citizenship. In response to the mandates of unification, and in seeking to 
reconcile the uneven recruitment of subjects by regimes of blood and space, German politicians began 
to redefine the frontiers of the nation­state in terms of linguistic practices. By the late 1990s, issues of 
sover eignty and nationhood were recast by visions of the German body politic as a dis crete community of 
native­language speakers. This premise of linguistic unity was transferred to the threshold of nationality. 
Germanness was to be expressed through the idiom of language. The transformation of political subjects 
into na tionals should now require an act of linguistic performance: speaking German. Such a formation 
of linguistic nationality, although intended to promote inclusion, became simultaneously a mechanism 
of segregation and exclusion.
 In the accompanying public debates, the criteria of eligibility for naturaliza tion and citizenship 
(Einbürgerung) were linked to language: the immigrants’ knowledge of German. Christian Democrats 
insisted that applicants for citizen ship status needed to document their “integration into German soci­
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ety” by having achieved an “attestable level of language fluency.”46 Potential immi grants, according to 
this proposal, were expected to enroll in mandatory German language courses, preferably in their home 
countries; the applicants’ linguistic competence was to be certified by means of a final exam.47 The work­
ing draft of the dual­citizenship proposal likewise insisted on “sufficient familiar ity with the German 
language” as a prerequisite for naturalization.48 The primary aim was to “promote the integration of 
for eigners by offering German language courses. Foreigners completing such courses could obtain ‘inte­
gration certificates’ that entitled them to receive unlim ited work permits.”49 Representatives from liberal 
and con servative political parties regarded a formal evaluation of the applicants’ “knowledge of the Ger­
man language” as indispensable.50 The Bavarian Christian Union Party demanded a standardized “spell­
ing test” for citi zenship applicants.51 Likewise, Social Demo crats wanted to determine whether resident 
aliens had acquired “sufficient mas tery of German.”52 Otto Schilly, then federal minister of do mestic 
affairs, suggested in his original draft proposal that foreigners should be denied German citizenship if 
“communication with them proved impossible” and “if they were unable to make themselves under­
stood in German.”53 In its current form, as ratified by Germany’s parliament in 2002, and reaffirmed in 
2008, the legal provisions of the national integration text deter mine “German language competence” as 
a prerequisite for residence permits (for spouses) and naturalization.54 However, in 2011 the Ger man 
Supreme Court and the EU High Court have contested these provisions as incompatible with the anti­
discrimination provisions put in place in 2007.55
 This emphasis on linguistic nationality might explain why German lawmak ers agreed to extend 
the right of citizenship to children: second­generation immi grants can “inhabit the national language and 
through it the nation itself.”56 The linguistic construction of national membership “possesses plas tic ity,” 
for a language community “is by definition open”: ideally it “assimilates an yone, but holds no one”; and 
although it continuously absorbs new members, it “produces the feeling that it has always existed.”57 Lin­
guistic nationality fabricates “a collective memory which perpetuates itself at the cost of an individual 
forgetting of ‘origins.’”58 This formative power of linguistic systems, which provides nation­states with 
the capacity to absorb and assimilate a diversity of subjects, seems to exhibit a democratic propensity. But 
such a making of nationals is also inherently coercive: through the medium of language, and its strategic 
deployment in citizenship and immigration politics, the nation engrafts a hegemonic memory of Ger­
manness.
Language Proficiency and Racial Hierarchies
 Language politics in a united Germany seek to reinvigorate a fictive ethnicity of Germanness: 
the national community, that is, the population included and gov erned within the political frontiers of 
the state, is ethnicized through language. By imagining the German nation­form as a linguistic entity, 
social or political dispar ities can be “expressed and relativized as different ways of speaking the national 
language.”59 This has obvious political consequences. While the unity of a language community appears 
naturally predestined, German unification shows that linguistic uniformity is not sufficient to produce 
or to sustain ethnicity. Its historical specificity is affixed to a multitude of countries. As in the case of a 
divided Germany, the same language may be used by different nations. The same applies to English or 
French.60 For language “to be tied down to the frontiers of a particular” national form, it re quires “an 
extra degree of particularity,” a “principle of closure, of exclusion.”61 This principle is evident in the 
racialization of language.
 The ability of foreign­born individuals to increase the range of their linguistic competence, and 
to thereby become German nationals, is guarded by a racial im aginary of segregation and prohibition. 
Access to language learning is severely restricted, and achieved by the closure of linguistic borders. Pub­
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lic language pro grams for immigrants are offered, but the eligibility for enrollment is determined by 
their origin and residence status. Former labor migrants with their families and offspring, recognized 
political refugees, immigrants or resident aliens, and ethnic German resettlers are treated differentially. 
The categories of foreign ness and ethnic difference are constructed by variable degrees of linguistic ac­
cess. For instance, applicants for political asylum, even recognized refugees, are offi cially forbidden to 
enroll in state­funded German classes: “No public efforts must be made to promote the assimilation or 
integration of individuals, whose long­term presence in Germany has not been confirmed.”62 Certain for­
eign populations are to remain culturally excluded and linguistically isolated.63 This policy of linguistic 
segregation for refu gees stands in stark contrast to the nation­state’s treatment of other foreign­born in­
dividuals. Ethnic German resettlers from Russia or Eastern Europe are granted unconditional language 
access: legally defined as nationals, based on the princi ples of filiation and ius sanguinis, the blood­right 
of extended kinship, their lin guistic integration is supported by a multitude of separate government bud­
gets. Resident aliens or immigrants, however, can enroll in subsidized German lan guage courses only if 
they meet certain conditions. The decisive factor is their na tional origin: citizens of the European Union 
states or former German contract­states are permitted to enhance their German language competence.64 
But even in these cases, learning is restrictive: the duration and intensity of language programs (by hours, 
vocabulary, grammar) varies with each category of the ethnic register.
 Therefore, the “openness of the linguistic community is an ideal openness”:65 its permeability 
is in reality controlled by the official Ger man phantasm of hereditary ethnic substance. And the greater 
the state’s inter vention in the foreigners’ access to German, “the more do differences in linguistic com­
petence function as ‘caste’ differences, assigning different ‘social destinies’ to individuals.”66 Under these 
conditions, strategies of lin guistic exclusion come to be associated with “forms of a corporal habitus” that 
“confer on the act of speaking,” in its particular, idiosyncratic traits, “the function of a racial or quasi­ra­
cial mark”:67 “foreign accents,” degrees of language competence (broken German), unaccustomed and 
non­standard “styles of speech, language ‘errors’ or, conversely, ostentatious ‘correctness’” instantly des­
ignate a non­native speaker as “belonging to a partic ular population and are spontaneously interpreted 
as reflecting a specific origin” and judicial or “hereditary” status.68 The production of Germanness thus 
also entails, following Balibar, a “racialization of language” and a “verbalization of race.”
Linguistic Nationalism: The Rise of Language Purists
 During the 1990s, an era marked not only by German unification but also the con stitution of 
the European Union, the sense of belonging to a linguistic community has reemerged as an icon of Ger­
manness, invigorated by the myth of ethnic unity through language purity. Since German unification, a 
diversity of literary societies has come into existence to reclaim and fortify the nation's linguistic bound­
aries. Under the impact of global capitalism and European integration, which gave rise to hybrid forms of 
multilingual communication, Anglicization, and a traffic in foreign vocabularies, the survival of German­
ness—signified by German language—is deemed threatened.69 The rapid formation of literary societies 
attests to the reinvigoration of a popular national ism committed to the closure of linguistic frontiers: a 
desire to purge the national idiom—the “beloved mother tongue”—of contaminating foreign influences. 
  Most prominent is the “German Language Society” (Verein Deutsche Spra che). Founded in 1997, 
it recruited over 16,000 dues­paying members in less than four years. By 2013, it had more than doubled 
its membership.70 The members, drawn from a broad social spectrum, stand united as “citizens for the 
preservation and cultivation of German.”71 According to the society’s official charter, the members are 
bound “to defend the self­esteem and dignity of all hu man beings, whose native tongue is German”; “to 
combat the amalgamation of German” and its “excessive inundation” by foreign words; and to protect the 
93
Linke
Transnational Lives
“cultural distinctness” and “survival of the German language.”72 The movement’s publicity campaigns, 
via the Internet, newspapers, and television, seek to implant in public consciousness a sense of linguistic 
ruin: the adulteration and corruption of the “national character” of German by the infiltra tion of foreign 
idioms.73 Media headlines since 1997 in both local and national papers articulate the movement’s con­
cerns: “Battling against word heretics”; “Safeguarding the German language”; “Language purification”; 
“The shambles of language”; “Against language trash”; “The corruption of the German language”; “Pro­
tection against language dirt”; “The purging of lan guage”; “Fighters for the purity of German”; “The 
foreign subversion of language is shameful”; “Against language colonization”; “The murder of language”; 
“Pro German.”74 
 In an effort to sustain media coverage and public support, the German Lan guage Society has 
launched a series of initiatives: the establishment of local and regional chapters; the creation of a na­
tion­wide language forum; the production of Germanized glossaries and dictionaries; the bestowal of 
literary prizes and awards; and the administration of language tests. Moreover, in trying to gain recogni­
tion as a public service advocate, the German Language Society has inau gurated a “linguistic consumer 
protection” program. Under this rubric, the lan guage practices of major service sectors are scrutinized 
for potential as saults on the national idiom: the use of foreign words, especially Anglicisms, is rendered 
a public offense. The targets of inspection include the postal service, hospitals, funeral homes, airlines, 
train companies, and “German health insurance providers, German TV guides, German political par­
ties, German travel agencies, German utilities, and German mail order companies.”75 The furor of the 
publicity scandals provoked by such language tests and linguistic consumer protection surveys has effec­
tively placed an entire society on language probation: national allegiance is enforced by linguistic cen­
sorship; nationalization proceeds by the erasure of non­German vocabularies (which is also a turn against 
Europe anization).
 The ethnicization of language is enforced by other publicity campaigns. Since 1997, this move­
ment of “language warriors” or linguistic purists regularly con ducts nation­wide media contests in search 
of “the most un­German word [Un wort] of the year,” the “language heretic [Sprachhunzer] of the month,” 
and “the language adulterer [Sprachpanscher] of the year.”76 The finalists, typically businesses, institu­
tions, or public figures, are chosen on the basis of nation­wide opinion polls; the protag onists are then put 
at the pillory to be publicly ridiculed or shamed on charges of language defilement.77 Such media cam­
paigns are televised and publicized on the news, Face book, and Twitter, thereby broadening the public 
reach of shaming.
Conclusion: Language Politics in a United Europe
 The ethnonational fabrication of language has profoundly altered the conditions under which 
issues of immigration, citizenship, and national sovereignty are brought to light in public debates in the 
European Union. According to Claudia Breger:
Inclusivity with respect to race, national origin, language, and/or religion has perhaps proven to 
be more challenging in the German context. To be sure, the new century brought, on the one 
hand, belated—and internally fraught—processes of opening up hegemonic German concep­
tions and practices of national distinction... On the other hand, these hopeful developments have 
been counteracted by the confluence of local legacies of exclusion with trans national Islamopho­
bia trends…Over the course of the past decade, German public discourses have been marked by 
a frightening intensification, and mainstreaming of anti­Muslim rac ism.78 
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In this social climate, questions of immigration and national identity have been variously thematized 
in Europe. Language has become an ethnoracial for mation within the broader European concerns of 
border protection and national belonging. Germany is not an isolated case. France has declared French 
as the offi cial national language by a constitutional mandate: government business, legal transactions, 
social services, health care, and public education, including univer sities, are bound to the exclusive use 
of French. This mandate is however less successful in the private sector. Despite the European Union’s 
advocacy of multi lingualism and the push for ‘languages without borders,’ recent surveys suggest that 
less than forty­two percent of the European student population achieves rudimentary competence in a 
second language.79 
 There are notable national differences in multilingual proficiencies. In the United Kingdom, 
se cond language competence drops to fourteen percent, and in France to nine percent. These statistics 
are however misleading. The 2011/12 sur veys focus exclusively on formal second­language education in 
schools, where English, French, German, and Spanish or Russian remain privileged. These stud ies there­
by ignore immi grant students’ native language skills and multilingual competence in Arabic and Turkish 
or other Asian or African languages, which are not perceived on equal terms with Europe’s national 
speech communities. The political and educational institutions of the European Union not only negate 
non­hegemonic forms of mul tilingualism, but treat native­speakers of non­national languages as foreign. 
Lan guage nationalism is articulated in terms of race in the United Kingdom, where the members of the 
white British working­class fear to become ‘invisible’ or ‘eth nically erased’ by immigrant speech­commu­
nities, a process imagined as a black ening of the white phenotype by non­European lan guage speakers.80
 The presence of diverse populations in the European Union, whether immi grants, refugees, 
tourists, or citizens from member states or overseas territories, has complicated matters of national dis­
tinction by the signs of color: the racializ ing codes of ‘whiteness’ or ‘blackness’ are no longer reliable tools 
for ascertain ing foreignness. In turn, language politics in Europe have become matters of na tional secu­
rity. This is accomplished by both the racialization of language and the verbalization of race. Although 
the impact of global capitalism in Europe might serve as a catalyst for linguistic pluralism, such currents 
of change are always culturally mediated, resisted, transformed, and politically negotiated. While the 
future of a truly plurilingual Europe remains uncertain, the push for national sov ereignty and the racial­
ization of language has had a decisive impact on the turn toward exclusionary policies of citizenship in a 
globalizing Europe.
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